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REGIONAL COOPERATION IN 
EUROPE:  




The idea of a "Europe of Regions" has been around for three decades 
now. Its heyday were the 1980s and 1990s when the European Com-
munity/European Union was seen as a potential ally for regions in their 
pursuit for influence on a continent led by nation-states and for the im-
plementation of regional administrative and political structures (Knodt 
2001: 66). The "Committee of Regions" is one example of the impact of 
these policies and the role of regions inside the boundaries of today’s 
European Union. The motives for regional cooperation range from the 
importance of cross-border partnerships in order to develop regions 
politically, economically and culturally, to the lobbying for a certain re-
gional model on a European scale. 
Although the interest for these regional developments seemed to 
dwindle during the push for closer integration of the 2000s, it has be-
come a major issue in more recent times. One only has to think of pushes 
1 Izlaganje na konferenciji "Europa regija i mediteran. Kamo ide Hrvatska?, Split, 23. listopada 
2015. (Paper presented at the conference "Europa regija i mediteran. Kamo ide Hrvatska?, Split, 23 
October 2015).
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for independence in Scotland and Catalonia to perceive that the region-
al identity and the importance of regions on a European level have not 
at all disappeared. Indeed many European initiatives have been dealing 
with regional questions in the past decades, to mention but a few: the 
European Structural and Investment Funds; the INTERREG initiative 
of the European Regional Development Fund, etc. 
This paper considers the development of a concept of region 
during the Cold War. It is something that has not been in the focus 
of research so far, demonstrating the possibilities of interregional co-
operation even in a very delicate international scenario. By choosing 
the "Alps-Adriatic" region – roughly the region comprising the Aus-
trian-Italian-Yugoslav border areas – it shall be demonstrated what 
crucial importance different layers of developments had and can have 
for regional welfare in Europe. This region shows how relations in 
an international and interregional context have gone from being a 
model in divided Europe to becoming an institution in the European 
Union. Moreover, since the Cold War a "semiglobal system" was cre-
ated, where states – especially in Europe – were drawn to one or the 
other hegemonic entity, the scope for regional cooperation seemed 
quite scarce (Väryrynen 2003: 28). This makes the analysis of the 
"Alps-Adriatic" region inside a complex international and bipolar 
scenario important. 
Considering the closing of borders in a unified Europe during the 
migration crisis of 2015 and the mistrust with which governments en-
gage towards neighbors, it seems as a shocking reality that only a quar-
ter of a century after the vision of a unified Europe (without East-West 
restraints) this very notion appears to be in a grave danger. This makes 
the historical analysis of cooperation between states and regions even 
more significant. 
From the point of view of a historian, this paper is not aimed at pre-
senting solutions for today’s problems or to show the path for prosper-
ous cooperation in the future. Yet, considering the aim of the "Europe of 
Regions and the Mediterranean" initiative, history does not repeat itself 
and thus we should not study it to prevent the repetition developments 
that have already taken place at some point in the past. Yet, "[h]istory 
enables leaders to assess past experiences and learn from ill-conceived 
policies. History can provide policymakers with a deeper sense of per-
spective, an appreciation of past patterns and the wisdom to implement 
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more effective policies for the future."2 This assessment of the Geneva 
Centre for Security Policy and the Graduate Institute of International 
and Development Studies holds especially true when considering con-
temporary history. Thus, this paper will hopefully contribute to provid-
ing the aforementioned "deeper sense of perspective". Finally, a paper 
considering such a complex scenario can only provide an overview on 
the topic and mention some factors of interregional development, while 
a detailed picture will have to be the focus of future in-depth analysis. 
A Troubled Region 
The "Alps-Adriatic" Region is a unique case study. It encompasses coun-
tries having different political systems and ideologies, applying different 
economic policies and belonging to different groups of states during 
the Cold War. Italy was a founding member of the European Econom-
ic Community and NATO-member, Austria had to stick to neutrality 
once it regained full sovereignty in 1955 and Yugoslavia was a socialist, 
albeit non-aligned country. Thus, this paper reassesses what steps were 
needed and taken to make this region a success story of cooperation in 
divided Europe. 
For the "Alps-Adriatic" region one has to bear in mind that this part 
of Europe was on the one hand an integral part of the Habsburg Monar-
chy until 1918 and on the other hand subject to territorial conflicts and 
ethnic strife for six decades following the end of the First World War. 
Indeed, Austria and Yugoslavia debated over the fate of Carinthia after 
1945, a region claimed by Yugoslavia since the end of the First World 
War. Italy and Yugoslavia had completely opposing views on the future 
of the Italian eastern border region and especially the city of Trieste that 
had been claimed by the communist Yugoslav (Slovenian) leadership 
since the 1930s. Moreover, Austria and Italy had severe political and 
diplomatic problems concerning the South Tyrol region, mainly popu-
lated by German speaking population and subject to harassment during 
the fascist period. Thus, taking all these factors into consideration and 
the fact that these countries did not belong to the same group of states, 
any development towards mutual cooperation seems astonishing. 
2 Taken from the initiative "History and Policy-Making", a joint initiative of the Geneva Centre 
for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. 
See: http://www.gcsp.ch/Topics-Initiatives/History-and-Policy-Making
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Indeed, the international context plays a crucial role in this story. 
First, the Soviet indifference to the question of South Tyrol made a 
treaty between Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and Austrian 
Foreign Minister Karl Gruber – with the mediation of Great Britain 
– possible in September 1946. Herewith Rome could rest assured of 
South Tyrol belonging to Italy, while it had to guarantee minority rights 
to the German speaking population (Di Ruzza 2009; Steininger 1999: 
255-384; Idem 1997; Gehler 2001; Stadlmayer 2002; Pallaver 1993). 
Due to the Soviet-Yugoslav split and the developments in Yugoslavia 
post 1948, relations of the West towards Belgrade became examples on 
how to establish good relations with a communist regime already in 
the 1950s. This was also a first phase of international détente follow-
ing the death of Stalin in 1953. Italy and Austria benefited immensely 
from these developments. Austria and Yugoslavia officially established 
diplomatic relations in January 1951, when the theretofore existing po-
litical missions in Vienna and Belgrade were raised to legations and 
the actually never-existing war-status was formally abolished (Dedijer 
1980: 141f.). The development of Austrian-Yugoslav relations in the 
first years after the Second World War was hindered by difficulties con-
cerning the unsettled border problem in Carinthia and the question 
of the Austrian state treaty. The repatriation of some 27.000 Austrian 
(Dragišić 2013: 111ff.) – and 50’000 Italian (Di Sante 2007: 74-80) – cit-
izens held as POWs in Yugoslavia was also a constant diplomatic issue. 
Most prisoners were repatriated until 1947 but the last group arrived 
in Austria in July 1953 (Dragišić, 2013: 120ff).3 The situation was also 
difficult for the Italian civilians who found themselves in Yugoslavia 
after the end of the war. The Peace Treaty with Italy signed on 10 Feb-
ruary 1947 sanctioned the assignation of most of the former Italian 
territories of Dalmatia and Istria to Yugoslavia, while Trieste and its 
surroundings would form the "Free Territory of Trieste" (FTT), sub-
divided in an Anglo-American "Zone A" and a Yugoslav "Zone B" of 
administration (Cialdea/Vismara 1947; Varsori 2006: 156-163). This 
question was solved in October 1954 with the London "Memorandum 
of Understanding" – albeit only with a provisional status, transferring 
administration of the two zones to Italy and Yugoslavia respectively. 
3 Yugoslavia transferred 132 Austrian war criminals to Austria, while 15 persons were shot and 
seven died a natural death. See: Arhiv Jugoslavije (hereafter: AJ), KPR 837, I-2-a/9: Austrijski ratni 
zločinci, no date.
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Austria could sign its State Treaty in May 1955, regaining full sover-
eignty (Dragišić 2013; Höll 1988a; Jesih 2004; Stourzh 1998; Suppan/
Stourzh/Mueller 2005). In November 1955, Yugoslavia acceded to the 
state treaty, happy enough to be released from the threat emanating 
from the Soviet troops stationed in Austria. Belgrade herewith officially 
abandoned any claims on border changes in southern Carinthia (Höll 
1988b: 205-251).4 
Yet many of the questions debated between these three countries 
remained open for discussion – first and foremost the minority is-
sues. Most important in this context was the stance of Yugoslavia to-
wards its two Western neighbors. First, although the "Memorandum 
of Understanding" with Italy did create a platform for further devel-
opment of bilateral relations, its provisional status would thereafter 
leave room for misinterpretation and misjudgment on both sides of 
the Adriatic. The fact that "Yugoslav" minorities outside the "Zone A" 
were not granted a special status would also interfere in bilateral af-
fairs. Second, the Austrian state treaty and especially article 7 defin-
ing the obligations toward "the Slovene and Croat minorities" was to 
cause the most serious disgruntlement between Yugoslav and Austrian 
politicians and diplomats in the years and decades to come (Matsch-
er 2005: 783-819). Moreover, Austria conducted a more active role 
towards the Italian governments’ handling of the problem of South 
Tyrol and the German-speaking population after 1955. The following 
years were characterized by Austrian pressure for minority rights in 
the region and the successful attempt to bring up the question at the 
United Nations in 1960, deteriorating bilateral relations.5 Furthermore 
the years of (infrastructure) bombings by pro-Austrian forces in South 
Tyrol, complicated the path to a solution of the question even more 
(Steininger Südtirolfrage 1997: 3-23; Idem 2011: 211; Idem 2003). A 
solution deemed acceptable to both countries was only found with the 
"package" of 1969 and the autonomy statute of 1972 (Di Ruzza 2009; 
Muigg 2005). Interestingly enough, the Slovenian minority issue cre-
ated some problems for bilateral relations between Belgrade and Rome 
(due to the lack of special minority rights outside the former "Zone 
A") as well as Belgrade and Vienna up to the 1970s – foremost after the 
4 The definite renouncement by official Belgrade on Austrian territory was done not before April 
1965, when an agreement confirmed the exact borderline. 
5 United Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 1497 (XV), 31.10.1960, item 68.
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"Ortstafelsturm" in 1972 – (Pirker 2004: 81-94)6 while Yugoslav covert 
operations and bomb attacks in Austria led to further escalation. An 
exchange of notes in 1974 showed how relations between Vienna and 
Belgrade had almost reached the freezing point (Elste/Wadl: 2015).7 
In 1976 a law was passed in Austria that granted major rights for the 
Slovenian population of Austria, leading to a normalization of rela-
tions in the following years (Klemenčič/Klemenčič 2010; Liedermann, 
2002: 535; Osolnik 1977: 180).8 The question of the Slovene popula-
tion outside the former "Zone A" in Italy was less heatedly discussed 
in later years too, and eventually, the minority status and rights were 
expanded in the late 1990s and early 2000s.9 
Cooperation in Cold War Europe 
The years following the diplomatic solutions of the mid 1950s were 
characterized by a significant increase of exchange between the three 
countries. Within the frame of international developments, Austria, 
Italy and Yugoslavia all sought regional economic integration for the 
development of their respective countries and border regions. One 
only has to study the commercial and cross border agreements of the 
late 1950s and 1960s to understand that all governments involved in 
the "Alps-Adriatic" area were genuinely interested in the expansion of 
economic ties to neighboring states (Portmann/Ruzicic-Kessler, 2014; 
297ff). For instance, Italy granted loans to Yugoslavia for its econom-
ic development and the two countries signed commercial agreements 
6 AJ, KPR 837, I-2-a; Note 6 November 1972; AJ, F-507, IX 6/V-73, Austrija: Podsetnik o Aus-
triji i jugoslovensko-austrijskim odnosima, 12 September 1972; National Archives London (NAL), 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 33/1676, Political Relations between Austria and Yu-
goslavia. Letter from the British embassy in Vienna to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 21 
December 1972; Notes of the SFR of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Austria Concerning Current 
Problems between the Two Countries, In: Yugoslav Survey Vol. V, No. 4, (1974), 139-158.
7 Notes of the SFR of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Austria Concerning Current Problems 
between the Two Countries, In: Yugoslav Survey Vol. V, No. 4, (1974), 139-158.
8 AJ, F-507, IX 6/V-76, Zabeleška o razgovoru sa saveznim kancelarom Brunom Krajskim iu 
Beču 19. maja 1976. godine, signed by Bogdan Osolnik; AJ, F-507, IX 6/V-78, Letter from Stane 
Dolanc to Bruno Kreisky, 16.05.1976; AJ, F-507, IX 6/V-78, Aide-Memoire über die Regierungsvor-
lage eines Volksgruppengesetzes und seiner Begründung, June 1976. 
9 Legge n. 482, 15 Dicembre 1999, "Norme in materia di tutela delle minoranze linguistiche 
storiche", in: Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 297, 20.12.1999; Legge n. 38, 23 Febbraio 2001, "Norme per 
la tutela della minoranza slovena della regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia, in: Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 56, 
8.3.2001.
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on facilitated cross-border traffic in 1955 and 1957 already (Cattaruzza, 
2007: 331f; Monzali 2004: 50).10 
The interest in neighbors was also reflected in an active and fruitful 
visiting diplomacy, starting in the early 1960s. Austrian Foreign Min-
ister Bruno Kreisky’s visit to Belgrade in spring 1960 and his Yugoslav 
colleague’s counter-visit in autumn 1960 initiated a longer phase of nor-
malization.11 In 1959 an Italian undersecretary of state visited Yugosla-
via for the first time, whereas Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović 
visited Italy in 1960 (Cattaruzza 2007: 336). This diplomatic détente 
culminated in the first visit to Belgrade by an Italian Prime Minister – 
Aldo Moro – in November 1965. During Moro’s visit, Tito affirmed that 
the economic rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Italy was a very 
important milestone in bilateral relations and that the discussions of 
the mixed commission set up in 1963 to solve problems resulting from 
the agreement of 1954 had helped in finding some common ground in 
international politics. Additionally, Tito stressed that Yugoslav-Italian 
relations were a good example of international collaboration beyond 
ideological barriers. Moro affirmed the Italian intention of "helping Yu-
goslavia in international forums" to further develop its interests. Both 
politicians also agreed that a visa-free regime between the two countries 
and the economic exchange should be further promoted.12 Moreover, 
after a visit by federal chancellor of Austria Josef Klaus, to Yugoslavia in 
March 1965, it was said in a joint communiqué that the talks "have been 
conducted in a friendly atmosphere, which has for years been a charac-
teristic of relations between the two countries", and that "good neigh-
borly relations [....] have been developing, regardless of the differences 
in their social system, in a very satisfactory manner [...] on the basis of 
mutual respect and non-interference."13 And in a Yugoslav preparation 
10 Legge 19 dicembre 1956, n. 1588, Approvazione dei Accordi fra l’Italia e la Jugoslavia, conclusi 
a Roma il 31 marzo 1955 (GU n.32 del 5.2.1957 – Suppl. Ordinario 320).
11 See the documentation: AJ, F-507, IX 6/V-71, Zabeleška o razgovoru sa Ambasadorom Austrie 
g. Wodak dana 14 maja 1958, signed by Aleš Bebler; AJ, I-3-a, Informacija. Austrija i jugosloven-
sko-austrijiski odnosi (povodom posete austrijskog predsednika Republike Franc-a Jonas-a u Jugo-
slaviji), 12.09.1968; AJ, I-3-a, Informativna beleška o Austriji, 16.03.1960; AJ, Kabinet Predsednika 
Republike (KPR) 837, Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Predsednika sa Predsednikom vlade Republike 
Italije Aldom Morom, 9.11.1965.
12 AJ, KPR 837, I-3-a/44-31Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Predsednika sa Predsednikom vlade 
Republike Italije Aldom Morom, 9.11.1965.
13 Relations between Yugoslavia and Austria, in Yugoslav Survey VIII, no. 1 (1967) 134.
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paper it was stated that "the political, economic, and cultural relations 
have reached a level that can be characterized as friendly. It is obvious 
that between the two countries common interests and a high degree of 
accordance in some crucial questions related to the world peace and the 
cooperation in Europe exist."14 
These years also brought new initiatives to life between Austria and 
Italy. A commission was installed to clear the open questions of South 
Tyrol in 1961, yet its work was mostly stalled until 1963, when a new 
Italian government under Aldo Moro showed more openness to the 
question (Pombeni 2015: 126ff). Moreover, Giuseppe Saragat (first 
as Foreign Minister and later as President) and Pietro Nenni (as For-
eign Minister) were seen as favoured interlocutors for Foreign Min-
ister Kreisky (Gehler 2012: 173-208). This was of utmost importance 
in the bilateral scenario, since the years of bombings in South Tyrol 
created a high degree of friction between Rome and Vienna. Testifying 
to the importance of this question, Italy hindered Austrian ambitions 
for an association with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
the 1960s, linking it to the unsolved question of South Tyrol and the 
bombing activities in the region (Gehler 2009: 58-80). Thus, initiatives 
to solve the issue bilaterally were needed. In April 1964 the commis-
sion on South Tyrol prepared a "package" to solve the question, yet it 
was met with hostility and refusal by the South Tyrolean People’s Party 
(SVP) at first. Thus the discussions continued, while Italy still blocked 
Austrian-EEC consultations, until in November 1969 also the SVP ac-
cepted the "package", opening the path to a final solution of the South 
Tyrol question and deeper cooperation between Italy and Austria 
(Steininger 2004: 501ff). 
Finally, the fact that Yugoslavia could not keep up the pace of eco-
nomic development must also be considered within this trilateral frame 
(Jakir 2013: 83-108). The formula of self-administration of the Yugoslav 
federation started to show cracks in the 1960s and the division along 
national and "ethnic" lines was vividly discussed in economic affairs, 
whereas the gap between the richer, north-western and the poorer 
south-eastern republics inexorably widened (Artisien/Holt, 1980: 355-
369; Vuković 1989). These developments created even more incentives 
for Belgrade to cooperate with its neighbors, and for Austria and Italy, 
14 AJ, KPR 837, I-3-a, Informacija. Austrija i jugoslovensko-austrijski odnosi (povodom posete 
austrijskog predsednika Republike Franc-a Jonas-a u Jugoslaviji), 12.09.1968.
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to try and stabilize Yugoslavia, which had become an important partner 
for both countries. 
Another crucial factor for rapprochement in the "Alps-Adriatic" re-
gion was most certainly the year 1968. All three countries involved in 
this paper were well aware of the importance of the events during the 
"Prague Spring" and the Soviet intervention in August. All three shared 
the common belief that the Soviet Union could become a threat for 
Central Europe once again, and especially Yugoslavia felt the breath of 
Moscow 20 years after the split between Stalin and Tito. What followed 
were some quite remarkable steps. In this turbulent context, Yugoslav 
representatives in Rome held talks with party leaders and the Foreign 
Ministry. While the Yugoslav ambassador was reassured by socialist 
leader, Pietro Nenni, that Italy and Yugoslavia’s interests were indeed 
identical in the question of Soviet intervention (Nenni 1983: 221f), Ital-
ian Foreign Minister at the time, Giuseppe Medici, formulated a guar-
antee over the Italian-Yugoslav border in September, allowing Belgrade 
to move its troops and strengthen the forces in the east (Maccotta 1993: 
58; Monzali 2004: 52f).15 Moreover, to further improve the quality at 
the official stage, Austrian President Franz Jonas – accompanied by his 
Foreign Minister Kurt Waldheim – was invited to pay a visit to Yugo-
slavia (Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Dubrovnik, Brioni) in September/
October 1968. The minority question and the Yugoslav claims for "re-
turning" cultural goods stood in the foreground of the talks that were 
led under "very friendly auspices" (Höll 1988a: 429). The situation in 
Czechoslovakia was discussed too, and Tito noted with concern that 
"the intervention of Warsaw Pact troops would seriously jeopardise the 
process of rapprochement and cooperation in Europe."16 It seemed that 
for Tito the European cooperation with Austria and Italy was of more 
importance than the vexatious minority question, even more so in light 
of the developments in Czechoslovakia. 
The events and talks during the summer and fall of 1968 seem to 
have had an extensive impact on the further development of favour-
able relations of Belgrade with Vienna and Rome. Not only were the 
open words between the countries a tribute to the positive climate that 
aimed at solving any dispute still pending from the Second World War. 
15 AJ, KPR 837, I-3-a/44-43, Podsetnik o Italiji i jugoslovensko-italijanskim odnosima (povodom 
prijema ministra inostranskih poslova Pietra Nenija), 26.5.1969.
16 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik, 8 (1968), Heft 5, 315.
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They even cleared the path for talks about Italian-Yugoslav military 
cooperation on the Adriatic. This was a quite remarkable step consid-
ering the history of the two countries and their ideological gap. From 
1968 onwards, Yugoslav and Italian military representatives regularly 
met for strategic talks, while the navies of both countries paid visits to 
their neighbouring harbours and General Staff officers held lectures 
at the other country’s military academies. Moreover, Yugoslav mili-
tary circles suggested that the cooperation with Italy should yet "reach 
more important levels" than with any other country, considering the 
proximity of the two states.17 As another impressive symbol for the 
prosperous relations during and after 1968, Tito and Austrian presi-
dent Franz Jonas solemnly opened the "bridge of friendship" over the 
bordering Mur river in 1969. When the two presidents were driving 
over the new bridge, Tito suggested renaming it in Franz-Josef-bridge. 
The social-democrat Jonas bewildered asked why to do so. Tito ex-
plained: "Well, Franz Jonas and Josef Broz Tito." (Ivanji, 2007: 33) This 
was also a further proof of cooperation across ideological barriers in 
the Cold War, after Tito had for the first time visited Vienna in Febru-
ary 1967.18 Similarly, the visits of Italy’s Foreign Minister, Pietro Nen-
ni, and President, Giuseppe Saragat, to Belgrade in May and October 
1969 respectively, would further enhance the relations between these 
two countries. During the conversations held on 27 May 1969 between 
both Foreign Ministers Nenni and Mirko Tepavac, the Italian minister 
asked for information on the situation in Yugoslavia and in particular 
if the country was still threatened, as "if there is a danger to Yugosla-
via, there is just as much a threat to Italy".19 The second Italian visit 
in October of that same year by president Saragat would also follow 
the scheme of Nenni’s encounter with Tito and underline the pros-
pect for even better relations between the neighbours on the Adriatic 
(Vrhunec, 2001: 62-66).20 
17 AJ, KPR 837, I-3-a/44-43, Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove, Uprava za Z. Evropu (br. 
439496), Informacija o Italiji i o Stanju Jugoslovensko-Italijanskih odnosa, 25.11.1970.
18 The Bruno Kreisky Archive keeps an elaborate documentation on this visit. See: Bruno Kreisky 
Archiv (BKA), Jugoslawien, Box 2, Staatsbesuch des jugoslawischen Präsidenten TITO in Österre-
ich vom 13. bis zum 17. Februar 1967.
19 AJ, KPR 837, I-3-a/44-43, Razgovori "u četiri oka" sa Nenijem, DSIP (str. pov. 416157), 
27.5.1969.
20 AJ, KPR 837, I-3-a/44-46, Razgovor izmedju državnih delegacija SFRJ i Republike Italije 
održanih u zgradi SIV-a, 3.10.1969. 
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Thus, the 1960s witnessed a radical economic and political rap-
prochement in a region where diplomatic and political tension could 
be felt almost anytime (Portmann/Ruzicic-Kessler 2014: 306f). Howev-
er, although economic needs and international threats certainly helped 
achieve amicable relations, it is argued in this paper that these form 
but a framework and not the sole explanation for the developments 
outlined thus far. Another factor has to be stressed at this point: the sig-
nificance of statesmen for positive outcomes in international relations. 
In recent years Italian historians have discussed Aldo Moro’s vision for 
neighborly relations during his career as head of the Italian Foreign 
Ministry and as Prime minister between 1963 and his tragic death in 
1978 (Garzia/Monzali/Bucarelli, 2011; Mezzana/Moro, 2015; Monzali/
Šuran, 2011). One of the most commonly recited statements of Moro 
is: "Our neighbors must be our friends." (Monzali, 2011: 89ff) Indeed, 
when analyzing his papers and the research on this politician, one has 
to conclude that for different reasons he did believe in mutual cooper-
ation across system-borders and that the "Iron Curtain" could be over-
come through economic and political rapprochement. He favoured the 
rapprochement with Yugoslavia and his nomination to Italian Prime 
Minister in 1963 opened the path to the "package" for South Tyrol, 
while his Foreign Minister, Amintore Fanfani, also brought important 
help to this issue. His discussions with Austrian Chancellor Franz Jonas 
were also paramount for a positive bilateral climate (Pombeni, 2015: 
128ff). Moreover, in these crucial years of the 1960s and 1970s a lead-
ing figure of Austrian foreign policy was Bruno Kreisky – both as For-
eign and as Prime Minister. Kreisky also shared a vision of reaching out 
to the east and fostering good neighborly relations despite ideological 
or diplomatic problems (Röhrlich, 2009). Finally in Yugoslavia strong 
economic and political bonds to Western Europe were a prerequisite 
for the stability of the regime and for a future association to the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (Ruzicic-Kessler/Dragišić, 2016). After 
all, the country was threatened by high indebtedness and "revolts" from 
within like the "Croatian Spring" (Calic, 2010: 237–255; Halder, 2013: 
110–118; Ramet, 2006: 227–262). Yet, when studying bilateral docu-
ments on the region and internal discussions as well as résumés of the 
time, one can assert that through the rapprochement of the 1960s a 
deep sense of trust could be achieved between Austria, Italy and Yu-
goslavia.
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New Tensions and Solutions 
The trust established during the 1960s made it possible that perturba-
tions of relations caused by nationalist demonstrations, misunderstand-
ings and misinterpretations, did not affect the long-term prospect of in-
terregional and international integration in the "Alps-Adriatic" region. 
In response to Saragat's visit to Yugoslavia of 1969, President Tito 
was due to travel to Italy in 1970. In the weeks before the scheduled visit, 
political representatives from Trieste and the Julian March, as well as 
MPs from the far right, accused the Italian government of holding talks 
with Yugoslavia and giving up "Italian soil". This situation culminated 
in a newspaper article in Il Tempo on 28 October 1970, where "well in-
formed" sources were quoted stating that an agreement on the surrender 
of the – still bound to a provisional "status" – Zone B was close to being 
signed (Bucarelli 2008: 53; Cattaruzza 2007: 336f). This directly led to 
parliamentary inquiries on whether these rumors were well founded and 
if indeed Tito’s visit was related to the signing of an agreement.21 Aldo 
Moro, as Foreign Minister, answered that the visits of state effectuated in 
1969 as well as Tito’s visit were of utmost importance for good relations 
among neighbors and he emphasized that everyone could rest assured 
that "no surrender of legitimate national interests" would be accepted 
"from our side".22 Following these statements and particularly the words 
"legitimate national interests", the Yugoslav government appeared of-
fended. Obviously, Moro's words could be interpreted as an affront to 
Yugoslavia and as the Italian wish to gain control over the Zone B, which 
Belgrade regarded as a part of the national territory. Moreover, consid-
ering the growing turmoil in Yugoslavia and the autonomist gestures 
from Slovenia and Croatia in the late 1960s and early 1970s too, Bel-
grade could not afford to lose face on the international scene, especially 
when talking about a strip of land predominantly inhabited by Slovenes 
and Croats. Thus, Belgrade rejected going ahead with Tito’s trip to Rome 
that had been arranged for December 1970 (Vrhunec 2001: 96).23 Yet, 
testifying to the new trust, Yugoslavia did not want "to dramatize the 
21 A compilation of all Italian parliamentary inquiries as well as Moro’s answers in this case has 
been put together by Yugoslav agencies and can be found in: AJ, ACKSKJ 507, IX 48/I-475.
22 Ibidem.
23 AJ, CKSKJ 507, IX 48/I-475, Informacija o Jugoslavensko-Italijanskim odnosima povodom od-
laganja posjete Predsjednika Tita Italiji – sa sastanka Izvršnog biroa Predsedništva SKJ, 9.12.1970.
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events through a strong campaign against Italy […] Our country still 
wishes to intensify its relations with Italy […] which is in both countries’ 
interest […] The cancellation of President Tito’s visit shall not interfere 
negatively with our relations with Italy."24 In January 1971 the Italian 
and Yugoslav governments respectively publicized a statement that con-
firmed both parties' willingness to proceed with the improvement of 
bilateral relations, respecting the treaties signed between the two coun-
tries, including the 1954 "Memorandum of Understanding" (Bucarelli 
2008: 58). Finally, Tito travelled to Italy on 25 March. Again, the Italian 
side, with President Saragat, emphasized that the "Memorandum" had 
already clarified the factual border and that the question was but a mere 
juridical matter. Tito confirmed that Yugoslavia would be patient in the 
best interest of both countries (Vrhunec 2001: 104f).25 
In these same years, a serious crisis in Austrian-Yugoslav relations 
occurred when in June 1972, an ustaše group (ustaše being the ruling 
organization of the so called Independent State of Croatia, which ex-
tensively collaborated with Germany during the Second World War) 
consisting of 19 persons crossed the Austrian-Yugoslav border. One has 
to bear in mind that it was only in December 1971 when Tito had dis-
missed the national (nationalistic) leadership of the Croatian commu-
nists in the aftermath of the so called "Croatian Spring". The Yugoslav 
government promptly accused Austria of supporting the infiltration of 
terrorists into Yugoslav territory. A press campaign in the Yugoslav me-
dia against Austria followed this incident. In the autumn of 1972, Ger-
man nationalistic groups in Carinthia – unhindered by the authorities 
– destroyed some of the recently placed bilingual topographic signposts 
(Kärntner "Ortstafelsturm"). The alleged fear (especially in Carinthia) of 
Yugoslav territorial demands served as an "excuse" for this vicious act. 
An extensive and sharp exchange of protest notes followed this inci-
dent. In a letter from the Yugoslav ministry for foreign affairs sent to the 
Austrian embassy in Belgrade it was said that the Austrian government 
even after 17 years had been reluctant to fulfill its obligations from the 
state treaty, while at the same time it was very engaged in protecting 
the German-speaking minority in southern Tyrol.26 Maybe even more 
24 Ibidem.
25 AJ, KPR 837, I-2/48-1, Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa Predsednikom Re-
publike Italije G. Saragatom, 25.3.1971.
26 AJ, F-507, IX 6/V-73, Note 6 November 1972.
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disturbing for the Austrian side was a speech delivered by the Yugoslav 
minister of defense, Nikola Ljubičić, who on this occasion talked of the 
strength of the Yugoslav Army in direct connection with the setting up 
of bilingual signposts in Carinthia.27 
Yet, the cancellation of Tito’s visit to Rome in late 1970, the escala-
tion of minority problems in Carinthia in 1972 and the intensification of 
protest in South Tyrol in the same period, were all but small and in the 
end insignificant setbacks. The conciliation process led to the solution 
of minority issues in South Tyrol, with the implementation of the "pack-
age" in 1972; the solution of border issues between Italy and Yugoslavia 
with the signing of the "Osimo agreement" in 1975; the solution of mi-
nority issues between Austria and Yugoslavia with the implementation 
of new laws in Austria in 1976. 
Deeper Interregional and International Cooperation 
Once all national and international preconditions were affirmed, 
the deepening of regional connectedness led to the formation of the 
"Alps-Adriatic Working Community" between Austrian Bundesländer 
Styria, Carinthia and Upper Austria, Italian regions Veneto and Fri-
uli-Venezia Giulia (South Tyrol joined in 1982) and Yugoslav Republics 
Slovenia and Croatia in November 1978 in Venice (CNEL, 1992; Po-
ropat 1996; Vrsaj 1975; Klabjan 2013: 409-426). The task of the com-
munity was "joint informative expert treatment and co-ordination of 
issues in the interest of its members" specifically, "trans-Alpine traffic 
links, port traffic, generation and transmission of energy, agriculture, 
forestry, water management, tourism, environmental protection, nature 
conservation, landscape care, preservation of cultural and recreational 
landscape, regional development, settlement development, cultural re-
lations, contacts between scientific facilities" while "Commissions may 
be installed for the purpose of expert consultation".28 Thus, the commu-
nity's purpose was not to impair existing international and interregional 
contacts but to serve as a platform for mutual understanding between 
regions that had once been part of a common state frame (the Habsburg 
27 National Archives London (NAL), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 33/1676, Polit-
ical Relations Between Austria and Yugoslavia. Letter from the British embassy in Vienna to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 21.12.1972.
28 The joint declaration of Venice, 20.11.1978, in: http://www.alpeadria.org/
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monarchy). Moreover the idea was to "reconstitute a common base" be-
tween regions that had been "artificially separated for forty years" due 
to the fact that they belonged to opposite economic and ideological sys-
tems. These regions would otherwise have been "integrated like the fron-
tier regions of France, the Benelux states and Germany" (CNEL 1992: 
14). Thus, this transnational community would set the goal to intensify 
communication and cooperation in a region that had witnessed several 
political and diplomatic ups and downs in the 20th century. In fact, the 
cooperation would have some quite impressive results in the cultural 
field, while the ambitious economic and infrastructural plans would not 
be fulfilled before the breakup of Yugoslavia (Bucarelli, 2008: 78f; Catta-
ruzza 2007: 353f). This was a proof of trust on a regional level, since the 
motors for these developments had mostly been the Austrian regions 
and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, as well as Slovenia. Thus détente from above 
was followed by détente from below. Yet a prerequisite for this détente 
and cooperation from below was the national framework in which the 
regions concerned could work since room for manoeuvre of entities in-
side a state is dictated by constitutional restraints/freedoms, economic 
strength and the possibility of regions to develop strategic interactions 
(Knodt 2001: 67). For instance, in Italy the regions (not only the auton-
omous ones) gained more political rights in 1970; in Austria, a country 
with historically relevant regional affairs, the regions were allowed to 
sign "State Treaties" between themselves and the "Bund" in 1974; finally, 
in Yugoslavia the constitution of 1974 strengthened the role of the Re-
publics (Ableitinger 2005: 147-163). Thus, a high level of cooperation 
needs developments on a regional, national and international level. It 
also has to be stressed that local bonds were formed during the time of 
détente in the late 1960s as well (Valentin 1998: 172-212). 
The regular consultations inside the community were used to deep-
en the trust between regions and for the planning of new cultural and 
economic cooperation projects. The most important results of this co-
operation were trilateral cultural events, such as theatre representations; 
the connection of Universities in the "Alps-Adriatic" region; multiple 
scientific symposiums; the establishment of fellowships for students; the 
engagement for infrastructure programs, such as the "Alps-Adriatic" 
motorway between Udine and Villach (inaugurated in 1986). Indeed, 
in the summer of 1984, the representatives of Slovenia, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia and Carinthia unanimously agreed that there was no similarly 
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good cooperation between three countries in any other part of Europe29, 
even leading to the idea of a cross-border, trilateral application to hold 
the Olympic Games of 1992. Although the statement on deep cooper-
ation may have been slightly exaggerated, it was proof of how tight the 
relations had become in this international scenario and also proof of the 
relevance of such interregional connections, going beyond international 
agreements. 
Conclusion
The 1980s were characterized by other developments that had their 
effects on the "Alps-Adriatic" region. The gradual path to dissolution 
on which Yugoslavia was set after Tito’s death proved to be irreversible, 
especially in connection with Yugoslavia’s endemic indebtedness, eco-
nomic lagging behind the West and the surge of nationalism. The neigh-
bors, Italy and Austria, who were well aware of a possible destabilization 
after Marshal Tito’s death, naturally perceived these symptoms. Indeed 
Italian and Austrian diplomacy – contrary to some myths appeared after 
1991 – were not interested nor advocates of the dissolution of Yugosla-
via. Both had achieved a good model of cooperation and although they 
favoured internal reforms and possible further decentralization, the am-
icable relations to Yugoslavia were a factor that was not to be put in dan-
ger by nationalism or war. Italy (adding to the European Community’s 
contribution) even provided hundreds of millions of dollars to stabilize 
the country (Varsori, 2013: 125ff). The course of events changed this 
approach after the outbreak of armed conflict. 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia regional cooperation changed. 
Yet, the Alps-Adriatic community did not disappear and thrived in fol-
lowing years within the frame of now independent Slovenia and Croa-
tia, becoming the "Alps-Adriatic Alliance" in November 2013 and aim-
ing at the integration of the region within the European Union. Thus, 
this community has become a tool of inner-EU policy in the past years 
and the seed that had been planted during the heyday of cooperation in 
the "Alps-Adriatic" region resisted the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
To conclude, the example of the "Alps-Adriatic" region shows that 
regional and multilateral cooperation beyond nation-state agreements 
and policies can be achieved through following prerequisites: 1) the 
29 Kärntner Landeszeitung, 20.12.1984.
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willingness on a national level for mutual cooperation with other coun-
tries/regions, 2) the willingness of policy- and decision-makers to seek 
better relations for mutual prosperity and engage in policies to shape 
the future, and 3) the implementation of a framework for international 
cooperation within regional affairs in nation-states. 
Even though the challenges facing the region today are not the same 
as those experienced during the "bipolar" division of the world, it seems 
fair to say that leaders in Europe have to act on challenges they are fac-
ing instead of reacting and awaiting events as seems to be more and 
more the case. Therefore, a vision of international and interregional re-
lations is needed for this to come true. 
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